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ABSTRACT 
 
JENNA M. MEINTS: Audit Avoidance by Not-for-Profit Organizations 
(Under the direction of Jeffery S. Abarbanell) 
 
 
 Financial audits are an increasingly popular nonprofit governance mechanism with 
state governments. By 2008 nineteen states required that their not-for-profit organizations 
(NPOs) obtain financial statement audits based on the NPOs’ reported levels of gross 
revenues. This study provides evidence that an unexpectedly large number of NPOs just 
avoid reporting revenues that would require state-mandated audits. Audit avoidance is most 
pronounced in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York; the only states that freely disclose 
NPOs’ audited financial statements online. These findings suggest that state-mandated 
financial audits and public disclosure of audit results can be costly for NPOs. Results of 
logistic regressions suggest that NPOs with low or no management compensation are more 
likely to engage in audit avoidance behavior. I find no evidence that the strength of general 
state enforcement is associated with audit avoidance. These results have implications for 
recent and ongoing efforts to improve non-profit governance and accountability via specific 
public policies.  
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1.  Introduction 
 According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS; 2011) there were 
approximately 1,046,719 registered public charities in the United States as of November 2010. In 
2008 charities held over $2.6 billion in assets, received over $1.4 trillion in revenues, and 
expended over $1.3 trillion in charitable funds.  Individuals, corporations, and foundations 
donated more than $303 billion to charitable causes in 2009 (Wing et al., 2010). The 
considerable economic footprint of charities combined with highly publicized governance 
failures, involving such well-known institutions as the Red Cross, the United Way, and the 
Nature Conservancy, underscore the need for better governance and accountability in the NPO 
sector (e.g., Mead, 2007).
1
 This study investigates whether not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) 
manipulate their accounting to avoid state laws that require financial audits. 
States, which are arguably the most capable regulators of NPOs within their borders, 
have taken steps toward stronger governance of the NPO sector through the passage of 
legislation that mandates audited financial disclosures from NPOs. As of 2008, nineteen states 
required that certain charities obtain financial audits, depending on their reported levels of “gross 
revenues.”  For all of these states, gross revenues are net of rental expenses, the cost basis of 
securities sold, the cost basis of other assets sold, special events costs, and the cost of goods 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this study, “not-for-profit organization” (NPO) means any 501(c) 3 tax-exempt public charity that has 
a charitable social services purpose. Hospitals, educational institutions, foundations, and other 501(c)3 tax-exempt 
organizations that are subject to different legal rules from  most 501(c)3 social services charities are excluded from 
this group. 
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sold.
2
 For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General Office required audited financial 
statements from MA charities with gross revenues of at least $100,000 from roughly 1979 
through 1998, $250,000 during 1998-2004, and $500,000 since January 1, 2005.
 
Several other 
states are considering passing or have already drafted legislation to pass their own audited 
financial disclosure requirements. Other states have revised their financial disclosure practices in 
recent years.
3
  Wide variation in these practices across states provides a naturally powerful 
setting in which to investigate the consequences of state regulation. 
 Although mandating audited financial disclosures from NPOs is a relatively recent and 
ongoing trend among states, whether those disclosures assist states in governing NPOs is not 
clear. It is uncertain whether this form of regulation is cost-effective and whether NPOs change 
their reporting behavior in response to audited disclosure requirements. This study provides 
relevant empirical evidence on the cost effectiveness and financial reporting impact of mandated 
financial audits.  
 My findings suggest that NPOs manipulate revenues downward to avoid engaging 
auditors. In pooled, cross-sectional analyses of 580,423 NPO-year observations, spanning 1989-
2008, there is a significant and unexpectedly large number of NPOs that just avoid crossing the 
revenue thresholds that would trigger financial audits. Using Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
smoothness analyses, I find there are significantly more NPOs than expected landing in the 5% 
bin immediately to the left of the standardized audit threshold.  
                                                 
2
 In general, state charitable oversight bodies examine line 12 of IRS Form 990 (prior to the 2008 revision), which 
reports total revenue net of rental expenses, the cost basis of securities sold, the cost basis of other assets sold, 
special events expenses, and the cost of goods sold. 
3
 A few examples, not all-inclusive: Effective in 2010, Washington instated its first audit requirement. Illinois and 
West Virginia also updated their audit requirements in 2010. Connecticut and Maryland updated their audit 
requirements in 2009. 
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 In general, I find that more NPOs just avoid their audit thresholds than those that just 
cross them in each of the twenty years 1989-2008. Audit avoidance behavior is acutely evident in 
Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. These three states have the highest unexpected 
proportions of NPOs reporting revenues just below their audit thresholds. They are also the only 
states that provide online, public access to multiple years’ worth of their NPOs’ audited financial 
statements. This evidence suggests that NPOs are the most reluctant to trigger audit requirements 
when their audited financial statements will be disclosed to the public. The result is consistent 
with the argument in Neely (2011), that financial audits induce costs that are greater than the 
associated benefits for NPOs. 
Previous literature has shown that some managers extract rents from their NPOs through 
excessive compensation (see, e.g., Core et al., 2006). This compensation could come in many 
forms, such as salary, extra expense accounts, financial benefits, or non-pecuniary benefits. 
NPOs explicitly disclose executive compensation (salary) on IRS Form 990. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that managers that are paid a higher salary are less likely to extract rents through 
other means. If so, there would be little incentive for highly paid NPO managers to manipulate 
revenues downward to avoid engaging an auditor because they have nothing to hide. On the 
other hand, managers paid a low or no salary might have greater incentives to extract rents 
through means other than salary, and thus would have a greater incentive to avoid an audit. 
Relying on logistic regressions that model the probability of the event that an NPO just 
avoids an audit threshold on total executive compensation, I find a negative correlation between 
the probability of an NPO just avoiding an audit threshold and executive compensation. This 
finding suggests that the lower the explicit executive compensation, the more likely NPO 
managers are to engage in audit avoidance behavior.  
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Recent research in the securities markets suggests that enforcement matters to the 
effectiveness of regulation (see, e.g., Coffee, 2007, and Jackson and Roe, 2009). In logistic 
regressions that model the probability of the event that an NPO just avoids an audit threshold on 
several proxies for state enforcement environments, I find no evidence that the strength of a 
state’s enforcement environment is related to whether NPOs avoid their audit thresholds. This 
finding suggests that existing state enforcement regimes have been inadequately crafted and/or 
implemented to have a significant effect on accounting manipulation.  
Finally, I investigate the method by which NPOs achieve downward revenue 
manipulation around audit thresholds. For my sample, NPOs that continually avoid audits report 
unusually high rental expenses and unusually high cost bases of securities sold in years during 
which they just avoid audit thresholds. These costs directly reduce the amount of gross revenues 
that contribute toward audit thresholds. 
 In addition to contributing empirical evidence to the ongoing debate about NPO 
regulation and required financial disclosures, this study is one of the first to examine audit 
thresholds across states. It is also the first study to examine how revenue manipulation occurs, 
and it does so with a larger panel of time-series data than examined previously. With respect to 
legal resources, this study provides the most detailed known resource on state-by-state laws 
addressing NPO audit requirements. Finally, this study introduces several new measures of state 
enforcement environments. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide background on the role of the state 
in NPO regulation, discuss incentives that affect NPOs’ financial management, and develop the 
empirical hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data employed in this study. Section 4 presents the 
main empirical results. I provide evidence from several robustness tests in section 5.  Section 6 
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describes and investigates empirically how audit avoidance can be achieved through accounting 
manipulation. Section 7 contains a summary and conclusion. 
 
2.  Background and Related Literature 
2.1. The State 
 Public donors are often far removed from the actual operations of the organizations to 
which they donate. These NPO principals have little ability to monitor agent behaviors. The 
inability of principals to detect and monitor malfeasance in NPOs heightens the importance of 
state regulation and enforcement to the non-profit sector. In fact, Easley and O’Hara (1983) 
argue that NPOs exist where state-imposed constraints on NPOs produce a “better” outcome than 
could be achieved with a for-profit firm. The relatively large role of the state in governing not-
for-profit organizations makes the not-for-profit sector a naturally powerful setting in which to 
investigate the effects of regulation. 
 Hugh Jones, President of the National Association of State Charity Officials, described 
the role of the state in an address to the Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and 
the District of Columbia of the United States House of Representatives Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee on April 30, 2008. 
 It is state charity officials who serve as the primary regulators over public charities and 
 are the parties most likely to pursue breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care and 
 good faith that our state and common laws impose upon the directors, officers and 
 trustees of charitable assets.  Typical regulatory and enforcement actions include, but are 
 not limited to, administering state registration and reporting requirements; correcting 
 inaccurate and misleading financial reports; redressing fraudulent and deceptive 
 charitable solicitations; enforcing charitable trusts and bequests; recovering diverted 
 charitable assets; imposing fines and penalties for violations of state law; and, 
 overseeing corporate mergers, conversions and asset sales. 
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 Although Jones described typical duties of a state, each state has a different scope of 
power over charitable regulation and enforcement. For example, New York has its own 
Charitable Bureau within the Attorney General Office that employs twenty full-time attorneys. 
The Bureau receives designated funding to carry out its duties, including charitable registration, 
reporting, and oversight. This stands in stark contrast to the majority of states that receive no 
funding for charitable oversight, do not have a separate legal Charities division, and employ one 
or no full-time attorneys to focus exclusively on the nonprofit sector. There is little uniformity in 
charitable laws and oversight across states.  
 As of 2008, nineteen states required certain charities to obtain financial audits. In various 
years, each state established slightly different thresholds at which NPO financial disclosures 
become necessary. Appendix A details these state audit requirements. The research design of this 
study exploits the cross-state variation in audit requirements.  
 
2.2. Incentives 
2.2.1. Cost-benefit analysis  
 Recent research suggests that the costs of undergoing a financial audit outweigh the 
benefits for NPOs; especially in the case of small NPOs.  In 2005, The Urban Institute surveyed 
a national sample of 5,115 NPOs about their governance practices and perceptions (see Ostrower 
and Bobowick, 2006). Responses indicated that one-third of NPOs had not undergone a financial 
audit within the past two years. This percentage jumped to 57% for NPOs with contributions less 
than $100,000. Among all NPOs that did not have an audit during the previous two years, 62% 
said it would be somewhat or very difficult to comply with a law requiring them to have one. 
7 
 
These responses suggest that many NPOs perceived significant costs associated with financial 
audits. 
 If a substantial number of NPOs perceived that the benefits outweighed the costs of 
publicly disclosing their financial information, then one would expect high percentages of NPOs 
to publicly disclose their audit results. However, the findings of Ostrower and Bobowick (2006) 
offer evidence that many NPOs perceive financial audits as costly and burdensome. In fact, 
approximately one-quarter of NPOs that did undergo audits chose not to publicly disclose audit 
results.   
 Neely (2011) studied changes in NPOs’ financial reporting behaviors with respect to 
California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) of 2004. Among other regulations, the NIA mandated 
that NPOs based in California with gross revenues of at least $2,000,000 must undergo financial 
audits. California enacted the NIA with the purposes of increasing financial transparency, 
mitigating fundraising abuses, and strengthening governance of NPOs. Neely (2011) examined 
the financial reports of a sample of 1,077 California NPOs that were subject to the NIA. 
Comparing pre-NIA and post-NIA IRS Forms 990 of NPOs that were subject to the NIA audit 
requirement, Neely (2011) found that there was little improvement in NPOs’ financial reporting 
quality, variable improvements in contributions received, and a significant increase in accounting 
fees. Neely (2011) also found that the change in accounting fees was greater for smaller 
organizations compared to larger organizations. These findings are consistent with the argument 
that the costs of increased financial transparency may outweigh the benefits for NPOs. 
 Similar to the Urban Institute study’s survey responses, the findings in Neely (2011) 
imply that the costs of (mandated) audited financial statements may outweigh the benefits. These 
costs may be especially burdensome for small NPOs, which constitute the majority of NPOs with 
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revenues near their respective audit thresholds. This leads to my first hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative): 
 
H1a.  There will be an unexpectedly large number of NPOs that report revenues just below 
the state audit threshold for an audit. 
 
2.2.2. Public disclosure  
 To examine whether NPOs perceive potential benefits from increased public disclosure 
of their financials, Ostrower and Bobowick (2006) surveyed how many audited NPOs chose to 
publicly disclose their audited financial statements. Of all audited NPOs, 24% chose not to 
publicly disclose their audit results. This percentage jumped to 34% of NPOs with contributions 
less than $100,000.  
 Of all NPOs that had websites at the time of the study, less than 11% of them made their 
IRS Forms 990 available to the public by posting the Form on their web site or by including a 
link to another website that posted it, such as GuideStar. This percentage dropped to 7% of NPOs 
with contributions less than $100,000. Taken together, the facts that up to 34% of all NPOs and 
up to 93% of small NPOs chose not to disclose their financial statements speaks not only to 
possibly limited benefits of public financial disclosures, but to the existence of significant costs 
associated with public financial disclosures. 
 If there is indeed a significant cost to public financial disclosure, then the presence or 
absence of a financial audit becomes all the more important for an NPO when a state publicly 
discloses that NPO’s financial information. For example, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York 
each manage a free, online, multiyear, publicly accessible database of its NPOs’ IRS Forms 990 
and audited financial statements. These are the only states that electronically provide full audited 
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financial statements to the public. At any time, any person can access the internet, click a few 
links on one of these Attorney General Office’s websites, and immediately have access to several 
years’ worth of any NPO’s audited financial statements and opinions. To an NPO nearing an 
audit threshold in one of these states, reporting revenues above the threshold not only invites the 
state to review its operations, it invites every person with internet access to scrutinize its 
financial details.
4
 
 Public scrutiny of NPOs’ financials has increased exponentially in the past decade. There 
are now numerous watchdog agencies that gather NPOs’ financial information and then rate 
and/or rank the financial health of those NPOs for public donors. Some of these watchdog 
agencies include Charity Navigator, the American Institute of Philanthropy, the Better Business 
Bureau Wise Giving Alliance, the Economic Research Institute, and Guidestar. Even if an NPO 
manages its resources prudently and conscientiously, there is always the possibility that the NPO 
looks “inefficient” in comparison to others operating in different environments. It is also possible 
that influential donors will disagree with some of an NPO’s management choices. Those donors 
may attempt to interfere and alter NPO operations. These possibilities can be distressing to even 
the most prudently managed of NPOs. The preceding discussion leads to my second hypothesis: 
 
 H2a.  There will be a larger unexpected proportion of NPOs that just avoid their audit 
 thresholds in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York, compared to all other states. 
 
2.2.3. Management compensation 
 Previous literature has shown that managers extract rents from their NPOs through 
excessive compensation and other perquisites (see, e.g., Core et al., 2006). If this is the case, then 
                                                 
4
 Research has shown that donors use NPO financial information that is publicly available online (e.g., Gordon et al., 
2009). 
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managers will have an incentive to manipulate revenues downward to avoid engaging an auditor, 
which would draw greater scrutiny. All else equal, if explicit executive compensation is low, 
then managers may feel justified in making decisions that are personally beneficial to them. In 
contrast, managers with high compensation would be less likely to succumb to a natural instinct 
to compensate themselves using the resources of the NPO, and therefore would have less 
incentive to engage in audit avoidance behavior. Formally, I hypothesize that: 
 
H3a.  Organizations that pay lower explicit compensation are more likely to report revenues just 
below audit thresholds than NPOs whose managers have high explicit compensation. 
 
2.3. Enforcement 
 Recent literature argues that not only are detection and monitoring mechanisms important 
for governance, but enforcement of these mechanisms matters, too (see, e.g., Coffee, 2007, and 
Jackson and Roe, 2009). Here, the strength of a state’s enforcement may differentially affect 
whether NPOs perceive that they can avoid audit thresholds. Strong enforcement environments 
may cause NPO managers to be more apprehensive about misreporting revenues. Conversely, 
relatively weak enforcement environments may provide the opportunity for NPOs to understate 
revenues to avoid the audit threshold and any resulting negative consequences that may come 
from disclosing financial information to the state.  
 With respect to not-for-profit organizations, Desai and Yetman (2007) construct state-by-
state empirical indices of detection and prosecution (enforcement) environments.
5
 Desai and 
Yetman’s Prosecution (Enforcement) index captures the number of legal assistance mechanisms 
in state laws that provide specific prosecutorial/enforcement powers over NPOs. Examples of the 
six enforcement mechanisms included in this index are the existence of Cy-près authority, 
                                                 
5
 Desai and Yetman (2007) operationalize information collected and documented by Marion Fremont-Smith (2004) 
in Governing Nonprofit Organizations. 
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limitations on reincorporating as a for-profit corporation, and of limitations on the liquidation of 
not-for-profit assets. Desai and Yetman (2007) find evidence that the enforcement environment 
of a state is weakly associated with lower insider compensation at private foundations, but not 
associated with lower insider compensation at public charities. 
 The Desai and Yetman (2007) study is the only recent examination of the association 
between state enforcement strength and NPOs’ behaviors. Given the paucity of research on this 
association, the issue of the impact of enforcement on NPO reporting is an open empirical 
question. For example, Catharine Wells was the Director of the Division of Public Charities for 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from 1979 to 1984. In prepared remarks for a 2006 
conference on nonprofit accountability, Wells commented as follows: 
 As an ex-regulator, I can be forgiven for bristling at the frequent suggestion that state 
 regulation is inevitably inadequate. Certainly, there are some states that devote only a few 
 resources to this important job, but there [are] other states that have active and effective 
 offices. In Massachusetts, from 1979 to 1984, the Division had six lawyers including one 
 lawyer who was also a C.P.A. In addition, there were eight administrative staff members 
 assigned to the Division. This may seem small compared to the tens of thousands registered 
 charities, but the Division was able to set priorities that resulted in significant levels of 
 accountability. While the Division registered about 10,000 charities, many of these had only 
 nominal funding. State law required an audited financial statement from each charity with 
 income in excess of $100,000 and the Division was active in enforcing this requirement. We 
 examined all audited statements for irregularities and had a regularized system for follow-
 up. In the course of a year, the Division contacted hundreds of organizations seeking 
 explanations and, in some case, changes in their practices. In appropriate cases, we filed law 
 suits. 
 
 This commentary implies that Massachusetts has a strong enforcement environment with 
respect to NPOs’ audited financial statements. Notably, Wells explicitly acknowledges the 
enforcement tools applied to audited statements. It is unclear, however, whether Massachusetts 
expends any enforcement resources on NPOs that are not required to have audits.   If not, then 
even the strongest of overall enforcement environments would not affect whether NPOs 
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manipulate their accounting to stay just below an audit threshold. The following hypothesis 
addresses this issue: 
 
H4a.  The general strength of the state enforcement environment significantly reduces the 
probability that an NPO reports revenues below the state audit threshold. 
 
3.  Sample Selection and Data Description 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 I began sample selection with skeleton information on state audit thresholds from the 
National Council on Nonprofits 50 state survey (2009), which provided state-by-state audit 
requirements current through June 2009. I manually fact-checked, updated, and expanded this 
information from state-provided legislation, LexisNexis legal resources, contacts with respective 
Attorney Generals offices and Secretaries of State offices, as well as publications from nonprofit 
law expert Marion Fremont-Smith (2004, 2007). 
 Financial information is drawn from the publicly available IRS Forms 990 that 501(c)3 
public charities are required to file each year with the Internal Revenue Service. The National 
Center of Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which is part of The Urban Institute, compiles this 
financial information into several datasets. This study uses data from NCCS Core files for years 
1989 through 2008. There are approximately 3,855,497 NPO-year observations in this set of 
files, although many of those data are duplicate observations. 
 The sample was restricted to NPO-year observations from 19 states with an audit 
requirement in state law that was effective 2008 or earlier. This restriction reduced the sample 
size by 1,872,704 to 1,982,793 NPO-years. 
 State laws limit the scope of NPOs affected by each audit requirement. After taking all 
legal restrictions into account, the testable sample was 928,761 NPO-years. I removed 
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observations that were missing any of employer identifier number (EIN), name, state, or IRS 
Form 990 filing date, and I excluded observations with “foundation” anywhere in their names. I 
also excluded observations of NPOs that were required by federal law to undergo audits because 
they received certain federal grant monies. The sample was restricted to those years between 
1989 and 2008 for which there was an empirically testable audit requirement in effect per state 
law. The final sample consisted of 580,423 NPO-years covering 94,437 unique organizations. 
Appendix B summarizes the impact of sample selection criteria on sample size. 
 
3.2. Data Description 
 Table 1 contains sample descriptive statistics. As seen in Panel A, most financial 
variables are non-normally distributed and skewed to the right (e.g., skewness for total revenue is 
49.7 and for contributions is 95). Looking at annual median values, most NPOs are small with 
median total revenues of $174,079 and median contributions of $50,229. Overall, NPOs receive 
an average of approximately $4.64 in revenues for each $1 that they have in total assets. They 
have net reserves (FUNDBAL) of $674,914 and total assets of $1,271,159.  
 On average, NPOs receive a very small amount of revenues from investment income. 
They do not expend much on fundraising. Mean total executive officer compensation is $25,667, 
which is a small portion of the mean total compensation paid to other NPO employees 
($352,410). Most NPOs do not compensate their officers, and most NPOs pay out very little 
compensation at all.
6
  These statistics capture the essential, volunteer-driven nature of NPOs. 
 Panels B, C, and D of Table 1 describe the state, year, and NTEE distributions of the 
sample. In Panel B, Pennsylvania and New York comprise over 33% of sample NPO-years, 
                                                 
6
 Officers received positive and non-zero compensation in approximately one-third of the sample’s NPO-years. 
Mean compensation, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, for this subsample was $82,785, while median 
compensation was $53,000. 
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while Rhode Island is at the other extreme with just 0.50% of NPO-years. In Panel C it can be 
seen that there are more NPO observations per year in more recent years. Whereas there are 
10,216 NPO records for 1989, the sample has upward of 55,000 NPO records in each of its most 
recent data years, 2007 and 2008.  
 In Panel D of Table 1, the two most represented NTEE categories are those for Arts, 
Culture, and Humanities (A); and Human Services (P). Combined, these comprise approximately 
45% of sample NPO-years. Although not tabulated, the ten most represented NTEECC’s ranging 
from 3.77% to 1.96% of sample NPO-years are child day cares (NTEECC = P33; N = 21,881), 
baseball and softball (N63; 18,423), fire prevention (M24; 18,317), theater (A65; 15,968), senior 
citizens’ housing and retirement communities (L22; 14,930), housing development, construction, 
and management (L20; 14,870), animal protection and welfare (D20; 13,466), historical societies 
and historic preservation (A82; 13,247), human services for specific populations (P81; 12,833), 
and general human services (P20; 11,367).
7, 8
 
 
4.  Methodology and Results 
4.1. Audit Avoidance 
 Hypothesis 1 states that there will be an unexpectedly large number of NPOs that report 
revenues just below their state audit thresholds. To test this hypothesis, I calculated Burgstahler 
and Dichev (BD; 1997) smoothness statistics and Bennett and Bradbury (BB; 2010) smoothness 
                                                 
7
 The complete NTEECC distribution is available upon request. 
 
8
 Recent research has suggested that the behavior of NPOs may differ across NTEE categories. Although not 
directly related to the research question in this study, I examined audit avoidance for each NTEE category included 
in this study. Four categories had unexpectedly large numbers of charities just avoiding audits: A - Arts, Culture, 
and Humanities, N - Recreation and Sports, I - Crime and Legal-Related, and D - Animal-Related. Complete audit 
avoidance statistics by NTEE category are available upon request. 
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test statistics. In essence, BD and BB statistics are both standardized unexpected bin scores.
9
 
BD’s expected bin count is an average of two adjacent bins from the overall distribution, while 
that of BB is an average of four adjacent bin counts. Where BD statistics may capture too little of 
the overall bin distribution to estimate accurate bin count expectations, BB statistics supplement 
BD findings.  
 The cross-sectional, pooled sample of 580,423 NPO-years, spanning 1989-2008, was 
split into bins and analyzed for three separate bin intervals. Bins had interval widths 10%, 5%, 
and 1% of the respective state-year audit threshold. All bin widths yielded similar statistical 
significance. For brevity, I report 5% bin widths for BD tests and 1% bin widths for BB tests. 
Bin counts, BD statistics, and BB statistics are presented in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 1. 
 Based on twenty bins with interval widths of 5% of the relevant state audit threshold, 
143,360 NPO-years landed in the bins from 50% below the threshold to 50% above the 
threshold.  As seen in Figure 1, there is an almost monotonic decrease in the number of NPOs 
that land in each bin, moving from the smallest revenue bin (left/negative: N10) to the largest 
revenue bin (right/positive: P10). This is not surprising because most NPOs are small, local, 
and/or grassroots organizations. These NPOs receive revenues below the levels at which audit 
requirements take effect. 
 However, the trend of decreasing bin counts across the distribution is not completely 
monotonic. Comparing the count of bin N02 (N = 7,225) to the count of bin N01 (N = 7,219) in 
Table 2, there is a difference of only six NPO-years between bins. This is a very small difference 
compared to the adjacent differences between bins N03 and N02 (7,638 – 7,225 = 413) and 
                                                 
 
9
 Based on the range of revenues observed in this sample, I estimated the standard deviation for BB test statistics 
from the unexpected bin counts in bins N20 to P20 instead of bins N25 to P25. There is no known change in 
interpretation from the original BB test statistic with a standard deviation estimated over 50 bins to this modified BB 
test statistic with a standard deviation estimated over 40 bins. 
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between bins N01 and P01 (7,219 – 5,665 = 1,554). In fact, this unexpectedly high count in bin 
N01 produced a BD smoothness statistic of 7.82.
10
 As seen in Figure 1, Bin N01 is the only bin 
that is not smaller than the bin to its left. This finding indicates that there is an unexpectedly 
large jump in the bin distribution at bin N01, consistent with manipulation of reported revenues 
downward to avoid engaging auditors.  
  Table 2 reports that more NPOs just avoid their audit thresholds than those that just cross 
them in seventeen of nineteen states. The two states that did not report a higher N01 bin count 
than P01 bin count were Arkansas (46 to 48) and New Hampshire (23 to 24). These were two of 
the smallest states by NPO-year observations included in the sample. The differences in bin 
counts were small: 1 NPO for New Hampshire and 2 NPOs for Arkansas.  
 
4.2. Public Disclosure Avoidance 
 Hypothesis 2 states that there will be a disproportionately larger number of NPOs just 
avoiding their audit thresholds in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. Each of these states 
provides the public with free, online access to multiple years’ worth of its NPOs’ financial 
records. In Table 2, fourteen of nineteen states produce an abnormally small decrease in the 
number of NPOs from bin N02 to N01. However, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York 
actually report unexpected increases in the number of NPOs from bin N02 to bin N01. 
 In Illinois, 538 NPOs land in bin N02, 550 in bin N01, and 414 in bin P01. The BD 
statistic for bin N01 is 2.72 (p < .01). In Massachusetts, 711 NPOs land in bin N02, 813 in bin 
N01, and 456 in bin P01. The BD statistic for bin N01 is 7.15 (p < .01). In New York, 1,541 
                                                 
10
 In untabulated results, the BD statistic for N01 was 6.97 for 10% interval widths. Out of 400,519 NPO-years for 
20 bins from 100% below to 100% above the respective state-year audit threshold, 15,445 NPO-years landed in bin 
N02, 13,310 NPO-years in bin N01, and 12,310 NPO-years in bin P01. The BD statistic for N01 was 4.98 for 1% 
interval widths. Out of 25,470 NPO-years for twenty bins from 10% below to 10% above the respective state-year 
audit threshold, 1,467 NPO-years landed in bin N02, 1,542 NPO-years in bin N01, and 1,167 NPO-years in bin P01. 
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NPOs land in bin N02, 1,609 in bin N01, and 1,245 in bin P01. The BD statistic for bin N01 is 
4.65 (p < .01). Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of these findings.  
 Table 3 further explores the impact of public disclosure on NPO audit avoidance. Table 3 
reports, by state from highest percentage to lowest percentage, the percentage of NPO-year 
observations that land in bin N01 (just avoids an audit) out of all NPO-years with gross revenues 
between 50% below and 50% above the respective state-year audit threshold.  
 For example, 30,197 NPO-years had gross revenues between 50% above and 50% below 
New York's respective state-year audit threshold. Of these 30,197 NPO-year observations, 1,609 
NPO-years landed in bin N01. The percentage of NPO-year observations that just avoided an 
audit in NY was therefore 5.328% (1,609 / 30,197). For Massachusetts, 6.147% (813 / 13,225) 
just avoided audits, while 5.097% (550 / 10,790) just avoided audits in Illinois.  
 Compared to all other individual states, Massachusetts produced the highest percentage 
of NPO-years that reported revenues just below the relevant yearly audit threshold. New York 
produced a higher percentage than all other states that did not publicly disclose audit results 
online. Illinois produced a higher percentage than all other non-disclosing states except New 
Jersey. Combined, the percentage of NPO-years within 50% above and 50% below a respective 
state-year audit threshold that just avoided audits was 5.482% for the three states that publicly 
disclosed audit results online. The combined percentage of avoidance for states without public 
disclosure was 4.687%. These percentages were significantly different χ2 = 33.2341. 
 These results indicate that NPOs in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York were the most 
likely to report revenues just below the audit threshold. This three-state pattern of avoidance 
directly relates to public disclosure of audit results in those three states. No other state publicly 
discloses audit results online. This evidence suggests that public disclosure of NPOs’ financial 
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information deters NPOs from triggering an audit even more than the presence of a legal audit 
requirement alone.  
 
4.3. Management Compensation 
 Hypothesis 3 states that organizations that pay relatively lower explicit compensation are 
more likely to report revenues just below their respective state-year audit thresholds.  I ran a 
logistic regression on the entire sample of cross-sectional, pooled NPO-years relating 
compensation to the probability that an NPO just missed the audit threshold and landed in bin 
N01.  
E1: Pr (N01 = 1) = α + β1*ASSETSit + β2*CONTCHit + β3*ROAit + β4*PROSECUTE +   
 β5*COMPENSit + ε 
 E1 was clustered by EIN (Employer Identification Number; a.k.a., organization). State, 
year, and NTEE category fixed effects were included. ASSETS is the total assets of an NPO at 
the end of its fiscal year. It is included to control for NPO resources, as compensation may be 
endogenous to NPO size, which, in turn may be associated with NPOs that report revenues well 
beyond relevant state audit thresholds. CONTCH is the annual change in contributions from the 
previous fiscal year. It is included to control for unexpected increases in revenues. ROA is 
calculated as total revenue divided by lagged total assets. It is included to control for the 
management resource efficiency. PROSECUTE is equal to Desai and Yetman’s (2007) 
Prosecution value for each state. It is meant to control for state enforcement environment.
11
 
COMPENS is the total amount of compensation paid to all executive officers in an NPO.
12
 
                                                 
11
 PROSECUTE does not behave exactly as state fixed effect. Multiple states had the same values for state 
enforcement environment. State fixed effects were included in the model in addition to PROSECUTE to capture the 
idiosyncrasies between states that identical PROSECUTE values would not capture. 
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Results from these regressions are presented in Table 4. Only the full model (6) of E1 is 
discussed here. 
 The coefficient of interest for Hypothesis 3 is β5 for COMPENS. In a multivariate model 
where the event is coded 1 if an NPO just avoids its audit threshold (Model 6), this coefficient is 
slightly less than zero and highly significant (β5 = -0.00000178; p < .0001). This result, though 
small in magnitude, is consistent with H3. As total executive compensation increases $1, the log 
odds of an NPO just avoiding an audit threshold decreases .00000178. The odds ratio of this 
result is slightly less than 1. As total executive compensation decreases (increases), an NPO is 
slightly more (less) likely to avoid an audit. 
 To explore management compensation further, I conducted a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test to assess whether there was a significant difference between compensation for NPOs in bin 
N01 (just avoid) and in bin P01 (just cross). For the variable COMPENS, there were 7,292 NPO-
years in bin P01 with mean total officer compensation of $17,524 (mean rank = 6,705). There 
were 5,725 NPO-years in bin N01 with mean total officer compensation of $14,662 (mean rank 
of 6,364).
13
  
 NPOs in bin N01 have lower compensation than those in bin P01. These compensation 
levels are significantly different (p < .001). The negative correlation between executive 
compensation and the probability that an NPO avoids an audit (falls in bin N01) combined with 
the finding that NPOs just avoiding audits have lower explicit compensation than non-avoiders is 
consistent with  officers  avoiding audits to extract rents  from their NPOs when explicit 
compensation is low. This implies that audit avoidance is undertaken in management self-
interest, especially if rents can be extracted through non-pecuniary benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 The effects of scaling by assets or fund balance are negligible. 
13
 All means reported in this study are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels, unless otherwise specified. 
20 
 
 4.4. State Enforcement 
  Hypothesis 4 states that the general strength of the state enforcement environment will 
be significantly associated with the probability that an NPO just avoids the state-year audit 
threshold. I conducted my analysis of the possible relation between the strength of state 
enforcement and audit avoidance in the same manner as that for compensation. With respect to 
Equation 1, β4 on PROSECUTE is the coefficient of interest.  
 Results from these logistic regressions also are presented in Table 4. If the general 
strength of state enforcement affects whether an NPO just avoids or just crosses its audit 
threshold, then one would expect the PROSECUTE coefficients for bin N01 to be significant, in 
either direction. β4 is positive and insignificant in all models. I conducted a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test of the differences in enforcement between bin N01 and bin P01. This analysis also 
produced insignificant mean rank differences between the general strength of enforcement for 
bin N01 and that for bin P01. Overall, these results suggest that the strength of a state’s 
enforcement is not associated with the probability that an NPO reports revenues that just miss or 
just cross its audit threshold. 
 
5.  Robustness Tests 
5.1. Exclude States   
 To ensure that certain states were not driving the avoidance finding, I conducted cross-
sectional pooled analyses on the full sample excluding certain states. The first reduced sample 
excluded Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. These states had the most acute avoidance 
statistics (see Figure 2). For 77,960 NPO-years from the sixteen remaining states in twenty 5% 
bin intervals, the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) test statistic was significant (BD for bin N01 = 
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2.17; p < .05).
14
 This significant result suggests that the three states with acute over-avoidance 
did not drive the overall avoidance finding. 
 The second reduced states sample excluded New York (N = 119,728) and Pennsylvania 
(N = 78,492). These states comprised over 33% of the original sample’s 580,423 NPO-year 
observations. For 92,333 NPO-years from the seventeen remaining states in twenty 5% bin 
intervals, the BD test statistic for bin N01 was significant (6.55; p < .001).
15
 This significant 
result suggests that the two disproportionately high observation states did not drive the overall 
avoidance finding. 
 
5.2. NPO Distribution in Unaudited Years 
5.2.1. Years not subject to audit requirements within the audited states 
 If the unexpected jump in NPOs landing in bin N01 relates to NPOs avoiding their audit 
thresholds, then there should be no such jump in revenue distributions for years without an audit 
requirement. For example, California’s audit requirement ($2,000,000 revenues) went into effect 
on January 1, 2005. As evidenced in this study, there is avoidance of the $2,000,000 threshold 
after 2004 (audit-relevant years). In years prior to 2005, there was no audit requirement in effect 
for California.  
 If the distributional jump in bin N01 seen after 2004 (audit-relevant years) was driven by 
NPOs seeking to avoid crossing the audit threshold, then there should be no such jump around 
$2,000,000 prior to 2005 (years without audit). Stated differently, if the distributional jump 
around $2,000,000 is simply a function of the most likely size of California NPOs (i.e., mode 
                                                 
14
 For 13,027 NPO-years from the sixteen remaining states in twenty 1% bin intervals, the Bennett and Bradbury 
(2010) test statistic was significant (BB for bin N01 = 2.02; p < .05). 
 
15
 For 15,749 NPO-years from the seventeen remaining states in twenty 1% bin intervals, the Bennett and Bradbury 
(2010) test statistic was significant (BB for bin N01 = 2.79; p < .05). 
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revenues of $1,900,000-$1,999,999), then there should be a jump in that 5% portion of the 
revenue distribution in each and every year – regardless of whether an audit requirement was in 
effect. 
 I created a new data set to test the audit-relevance of the distributional jump. This sample 
is focused on each state’s most recent audit requirement. Instead of including audit-relevant 
years, it included only non-relevant NPO-years – those in which the audit requirement was not in 
effect. Bins were constructed identically to the primary sample’s bins. For example, the set of 
non-relevant NPO-years for California were those NPOs within ten bins below and ten bins 
above the $2,000,000 revenue point for years prior to 2005. This dataset included 579,599 (non-
relevant) NPO-years across the nineteen states with audit requirements tested in this study.  
 For 111,681 of these NPO-years in 5% bin intervals from ten bins below to ten bins 
above the standardized audit threshold, the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) test statistic was not 
significant for the bin with revenues just to the left of the standardized threshold value. For the 
overall distribution of nineteen states in non-audit years, there is no jump in the distribution of 
NPOs with revenues identical to those in audit-relevant years. This result suggests that the 
distributional jump in bin N01 is unique to the existence of a relevant audit requirement.  
 
5.2.2. Years in states not subject to audit requirements 
 Following the logic of Section 5.2.1, if the unexpected jump in NPOs that land in bin 
N01 relates to NPOs avoiding their audit thresholds, then there should be no such jump in 
revenue distributions during the same years subject to the original audit requirement in another 
state that has no audit requirement. For example, California’s audit requirement ($2,000,000 
revenues) went into effect on January 1, 2005. There is an unexpectedly large jump in the 
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number of NPOs that land in bin N01 during NPO-years after 2004. If this jump in the 
distribution relates to the audit threshold at $2,000,000, then there should be no such jump in the 
distribution of NPOs around $2,000,000 after 2004 in any state that does not have an audit 
requirement.  
 I created another dataset to test the audit-relevance of the distributional jump across states 
with an audit requirement and states without an audit requirement. I constructed this 
(“unaudited”) dataset in the same manner as the original dataset, except that I included 
observations for all originally excluded states and excluded observations for all originally 
included states. In other words, this unaudited dataset includes observations only from states that 
had no legal audit requirements in effect by 2008. It covers 31 states, spans 1989-2008, and 
consists of 811,823 NPO-years. 
 I created pseudo-thresholds for each state that had an audit requirement by imposing the 
original state’s audit requirements on this new dataset in two ways. First, I imposed each of the 
nineteen original state’s audit threshold on the cross-section of all NPO-years from states without 
audit requirements. For example, I tested California’s audit threshold on pooled, cross-sectional 
NPO-years from the 31 unaudited states for NPOs with gross revenues from 50% below to 50% 
above $2,000,000 for years after 2004. When bins were set up for these unaudited observations 
identical to those that were set up for the California observations, there was no jump in 
observations in bin N01. None of the nineteen pseudo-thresholds produced a jump in bin N01. 
There also was no pattern across states of abnormally small decreases in NPO-years between bin 
N02 and bin N01. 
 In my second analysis of this unaudited dataset, I applied the pseudo-thresholds for 
Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York to the new dataset on an individual state-state basis. 
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These three states publicly disclosed the audit results of their NPOs, and they had the most acute 
audit avoidance. Illinois’ audit threshold was imposed first on Alaska (no audit requirement), 
second on Alabama, third on Arizona, and so on. Instead of testing Illinois’ audit threshold on 
one cross-section of unaudited states as before, this time I tested Illinois’ audit threshold 31 
separate times on 31 individual states that did not have audit requirements. I conducted the same 
analyses for Massachusetts and New York, for a total of 93 pseudo-threshold tests.
 16
 
  For each of Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York, none of the 31 pseudo-thresholds 
produced a significantly large number of observations landing in bin N01. Combined with the 
results of the cross-sectional pseudo-threshold tests, this finding indicates that the distributional 
jump in bin N01 seen in the original sample is unique to the existence of a relevant audit 
requirement. 
 
5.3. State Enforcement Environment 
 Main state enforcement analyses were conducted utilizing Desai and Yetman’s (2007) 
Prosecution (enforcement) index. To ensure that measure choice did not influence the relation 
between state enforcement and avoidance, I created and analyzed six supplemental general state 
enforcement proxies. Descriptive statistics for these proxies are in Appendix D. 
 As shown in Table 5, logistic regressions were re-run on Models 4 and 6 replacing 
PROSECUTE with each respective state enforcement measure. There is no evidence of a relation 
between any of the six supplemental general state enforcement proxies and whether an NPO just 
avoids its audit threshold. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Tabulated results from this section are available by request. 
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5.4. Federal Enforcement Environment 
 Tax-exempt organizations are subject to a dual regulation regime (see e.g., Fremont-
Smith, 2004). They are regulated by both state and federal governments. This dual regulation 
leads to the possibility that federal enforcement crowds out or otherwise interacts with the effects 
of state enforcement. If this federal enforcement effect does exist, then it may be the reason that 
state enforcement does not have a significant relation to whether an NPO just avoids a GAAP 
audit threshold. To control for this possibility, a measure of federal enforcement environment 
was created. It equals the percentage of tax-exempt organizations’ tax returns that the IRS 
chooses to examine by year. 
 This federal enforcement measure is based on annual information in Table 13 of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Data Books for years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Table 13 reports 
the number of tax-exempt organizations’ tax returns examined in the previous fiscal year. The 
federal enforcement measure for each year of 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 was calculated as 
“Tax-exempt organizations and related taxable returns examined in Fiscal Year 200X, total” 
divided by “Tax-exempt organization returns processed in Calendar Year 200X-1.” 
 To investigate whether federal enforcement is related to NPOs avoiding the threshold 
beyond which a GAAP audit is triggered, I ran logistic regressions where the modeled event is 
the probability that an NPO just avoids a GAAP audit. Models included state enforcement and 
federal enforcement (IRS_ENFORCE) as independent variables, as well as NTEE and year fixed 
effects. I clustered standard errors by state. In all models, neither state enforcement nor federal 
enforcement was significant.
17
 These results suggest that when one considers NPOs’ dual 
                                                 
17
 In expanded models, the interactions of state enforcement proxies and federal enforcement were also insignificant. 
26 
 
regulation regime, no form of enforcement relates to whether an NPO just avoids a GAAP 
audit.
18
 
 
6.  Methods of Accounting Manipulation 
This study provides evidence that a disproportionate number of NPOs report revenues 
that allow them to just avoid audits. To do so, NPOs must manage their accounting in a way that 
minimizes revenues during avoidance years. Per IRS Form 990, total revenue is net of rental 
expenses, the cost basis of securities sold, the cost basis of other assets sold, special events costs, 
and the cost of goods sold. Any increase in one of these costs directly reduces total revenue.  
 In a normal organizational lifecycle, an NPO experiences revenue growth and 
fluctuations over time. This implies that it would be unusual for an NPO to report the same level 
of revenues over multiple years. Arguably, NPOs that report revenues falling in bin N01 for 
more than one year (repeat avoiders) are the most likely to have managed their revenues in order 
to continually avoid an audit.
19
  
 
6.1. Rental Expenses 
 There are 220 NPO-years in bin N01 that have sufficient data to calculate the average 
annual percentage change in rental expenses. 157 of these NPO-years represent 157 unique 
NPOs, each of which landed in bin N01 only once during the sample period. The other 63 NPO-
year observations in bin N01 belong to 29 unique NPOs. These NPOs landed in bin N01 during 
                                                 
18
 The results are similar when tests were based on one-year-lagged values of the state enforcement variables and of 
federal enforcement. Unlike the implicit perfect foresight assumption in the main tests, these tests exploit the 
assumption that managers predict that state and federal enforcement efforts follow a random walk. 
 
19
 There was insufficient data to test the cost basis of other assets sold for repeat avoiders (N = 6).  
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two, three, or four years of the sample period. I split these 220 bin N01 observations into two 
groups: NPOs that avoided an audit once and NPOs that repeatedly avoided an audit.  
 Panel A of Table 6 reports my findings. For NPOs that avoided an audit in only one year 
of the sample, the average annual percentage change in rental expenses was -23.41% (N = 
157).
20
 For NPOs that repeatedly avoided an audit during the sample period, the average annual 
percentage change in rental expenses was 27.35% (N = 63).  
 I then created two non-avoider control groups. The first non-avoider group consisted of 
all NPO-years landing in bins 5-25% below the audit threshold (small; N02, N03, N04, N05). 
The second non-avoider group consisted of all NPO-years landing in bins 5-25% above the audit 
threshold (large; P02, P03, P04, P05). For large non-avoiders, the average annual percentage 
change in rental expenses was -9.61% (N = 703). For small non-avoiders, that percentage change 
was -11.16% (N = 911). 
 NPOs that repeatedly avoided an audit had an average annual percentage change in rental 
expenses in the year of avoidance that was significantly higher than that of all other groups.
21
 
This implies that only those NPOs that repeatedly avoided their audit thresholds reported 
increases in rental expenses, which decreased the amount of revenues contributing toward the 
audit threshold. In sum, the subset of NPOs in bin N01 that were the most likely to manipulate 
their accounting in order to avoid an audit indeed appeared to inflate their rental expenses. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 I winsorize means for rental expenses and special event expenses at 2.5% and 97.5% levels. 
 
21
 For Sections 6.1 and 6.2 two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances indicated that there were significant 
differences at p < .05 between the mean for repeated avoiders and all other means. 
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6.2. Cost Basis of Securities Sold 
 Following the same procedure as that for rental expenses, I examined a group of 331 
NPO-years in bin N01 that had sufficient data to calculate the average annual percentage change 
in rental expenses. My one-time avoidance subsample consisted of 271 unique NPOs. My repeat 
avoidance subsample consisted of 60 NPO-years for 29 unique NPOs. 
 The average annual percentage change in the cost basis of securities sold for repeat 
avoiders was 26.97%. The percentage change was only 3.52% for one-time avoiders.
22
 For large 
non-avoiders, the average annual percentage change in the cost basis of securities sold was          
-20.51% (N = 1,106). For small non-avoiders, the percentage change was –9.26% (N = 1,401).  
 NPOs that repeatedly avoided an audit had an average annual percentage change in the 
cost basis of securities sold in the year of avoidance that was significantly higher than that of all 
other groups. Like the findings for rental expenses, these percentages imply that repeat avoiders 
inflate their cost basis of securities sold to report lower revenues. 
 
6.3. Special Event Expenses 
 Following the same procedure as before, I examined a group of 1,689 NPO-years in bin 
N01 that had sufficient data to calculate the average annual percentage change in rental 
expenses. My one-time avoidance subsample included 1,458 unique NPOs. My repeat avoidance 
subsample consisted of 231 NPO-years for 97 unique NPOs. The average annual percentage 
change in special event expenses for repeat avoiders was 1.62%. This percentage change was 
0.41% for one-time avoiders, 4.83% for large non-avoiders (N = 4,973), and 5.83% for small 
non-avoiders (N = 7,640).  
                                                 
22
 I winsorize means for the cost basis of securities sold and the cost of goods sold at 5% and 95% levels. 
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 These percentage changes are not significantly different (p > .05). There is no evidence 
that repeat avoiders inflate special event expenses any more than other NPOs. This finding is not 
surprising, as special event expenses are incurred with much less frequency than NPOs’ 
everyday expenses and costs. Thus, special event expenses are more transparent to outsiders and 
riskier for the NPO to manipulate. 
 
6.4. Cost of Goods Sold  
 Following the same procedure as that for rental expenses, I examined a group of 821 
NPO-years in bin N01 that had sufficient data to calculate the average annual percentage change 
in the cost of goods sold. My one-time avoidance subsample consisted of 713 unique NPOs. My 
repeat avoidance subsample consisted of 108 NPO-years for 45 unique NPOs. 
 The average annual percentage change in the cost of goods sold for repeat avoiders was 
0.44%. The percentage change was -1.89% for one-time avoiders. For large non-avoiders, the 
average annual percentage change in the cost of goods sold was 6.10% (N = 3,474). For small 
non-avoiders, that percentage change was 2.69% (N = 2,310). These percentage changes are not 
significantly different (p > .05). There is no evidence that repeat avoiders inflate cost of goods 
sold any more than other NPOs. Compared to rental expenses, the cost basis of securities sold, 
and special event expenses, the cost of goods sold is the only expense that relates directly to an 
NPO’s main operations. Therefore, outsiders may scrutinize the cost of goods sold more than 
expenses associated with auxiliary accounts. The cost of goods sold relays information about 
management of central operations. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 Regulation is the backbone of financial accountability and its effects can have significant 
impacts on the economy. The importance of the state in charitable administration, monitoring, 
and enforcement combined with the wide variation in these practices across states provides a 
naturally powerful setting in which to investigate the consequences of regulation. This study 
utilizes smoothness analyses and logistic regressions to examine whether not-for-profit 
organizations manipulate their accounting to circumvent state laws that require financial audits.  
My main findings are as follows:  First, some NPOs appear to manipulate revenues 
downward to avoid engaging auditors. In pooled, cross-sectional analyses of 580,423 NPO-year 
observations spanning 1989-2008, there is a significant and unexpectedly large number of NPOs 
that just avoid crossing the revenue threshold past which they would need to obtain financial 
audits. Second, this avoidance result is especially evident in Illinois, Massachusetts, and New 
York. These three states are the only states that provide publicly accessible, online, multiyear 
databases of NPOs’ IRS Forms 990 and financial audits. This finding suggests that an NPO is the 
most likely to avoid an audit when the state under whose jurisdiction the NPO resides freely 
discloses the NPO’s financial information to the public. Third, evidence from logistic regressions 
suggests that an NPO’s management is more likely to avoid an audit when explicit executive 
compensation is low. Fourth, logistic regressions employing seven different measures of general 
state enforcement environments produce no evidence that the strength of a state’s general 
enforcement environment is related to whether NPOs just avoid their audit thresholds. Finally, 
this study provided evidence that NPOs inflate rental expenses and the cost basis of securities 
sold to continually avoid reporting revenues that cross audit thresholds.  
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Appendix A: Not-for-profit sector audit requirements in effect by 2008 
 
 
State 
Accounting 
Measure Amount 
Most recent threshold, 
included
1
 Other threshold(s), included 
Other threshold(s), 
excluded 
Arkansas mod
2
 gross revenues $500,000 2001 
 
1998/1992: $100K/$25K 
(AR grants) 
California gross revenues $2,000,000 January 1, 2005     
Connecticut mod gross revenues $200,000 October 1, 2005 June 1, 2000:  $100K July 1, 2009: $500K 
Georgia gross revenues $1,000,000 2000
4
     
Illinois gross revenues $150,000 1997
4
   January 1, 2010:  $300K 
Kansas
3
 contributions $500,000 July 1, 2005 1993
4
:  $100K   
Maryland
3
 contributions $200,000 2004
4
   June 1, 2009: $500K 
Massachusetts gross revenues $500,000 January 1, 2005 1998
4
: $250K; 1979
4
: $100K   
Minnesota gross revenues $750,000 July 31, 2008 July 1, 1997: $350K; 
4
Earlier: $100K   
Mississippi contributions $500,000 July 1, 2008 July 1, 1997: $100K; 
4
Earlier: $50K   
New Hampshire
3
 gross revenues $1,000,000 September 30, 2004     
New Jersey gross revenues $250,000 July 8, 2006 Since at least 2003
4
: $100K   
New Mexico gross revenues $500,000 1999
4
     
New York
3
 gross revenues $250,000 2002 1977: $150K   
Pennsylvania
3
 contributions $300,000 December 26, 2006 June 22, 2001: $125K; 1990: $100K   
Rhode Island gross revenues $500,000 July 2, 2004 
 
  
Tennessee
3
 gross revenues $500,000 July 1, 2007 April 18, 2001: $300K; 1997: $250K 1976:  $10K 
West Virginia mod contributions $100,000 June 7, 2002 1995: $50K June 12, 2010: $200K 
Wisconsin contributions $400,000 April 22, 2008 1991
4
: $100K   
OMB Circular A-133
5
 federal grants $500,000 December 31, 2003 1996: $300K; 1984: $100K   
 
This appendix presents state-by-state audit requirements in effect by 2008 and tested in this study. Note 1:  Included = Included in study 
design. Excluded = Excluded because data not available at time of study. Note 2:  Mod = Modified, per state law. Note 3:  Confirmed 
threshold information with respective Attorney General Office and/or Secretary of State Office. Note 4:  Best estimate based on available 
sources. Note 5:  Office of Management and Budget Circular A-133: Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations. 
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Appendix B:  Sample Selection 
 N lost 
N 
retained 
All state-years: 1989 - 2008   3,855,497  
  
 
  
Restrict to states with empirically testable state law audit requirements (1,872,704) 1,982,793  
STATE = AR, CA, CT, GA, IL, KS, MD, MA, MN, MS,  
 
  
NH, NJ, NM, NY, PA, RI, TN, WV, WI 
 
  
  
 
  
Exclude trusts and unknown organizational forms (71,804) 1,910,989  
ORGCD = 1, 3, 4, 5 
 
  
  
 
  
Restrict to NPOs that receive substantial proportion of incomes from 
public/government/work related to charitable missions (301,615) 1,609,374  
FNDNCD = 15, 16 
 
  
  
 
  
Restrict to certain NTEE major groupings (597,112) 1,012,262  
NTEE1 = A, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, U, V 
 
  
  
 
  
Restrict to certain NTEECC's (83,501) 928,761  
NTEECC not A - Z 01-05, 11, 12, 19. Not N61. 
 
  
  
 
  
Restrict to NPOs not missing necessary IRS Form 990 data (24,300) 904,461  
  
 
  
Delete organizations that contain "foundation" anywhere in name (37,942) 866,519  
  
 
  
Restrict to years in which an audit requirement was in effect per state law (235,023) 631,496  
  
 
  
Delete organizations that were required to undergo an audit based on the 
amount of federal grant money received (per federal law) (10,365) 621,131  
  
 
  
Delete organizations from MA that were required to undergo an audit 
because total assets were at least $5 million (per state law) (40,708) 580,423  
      
 
This Appendix presents the step-by-step criteria that were used to select the sample in this study.  
 
N lost = NPO-year observations excluded from final sample. 
NTEE = National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
NTEECC = National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Core Codes 
Variable names/codes listed, per NCCS methodology. 
Final sample size is 580,423 NPO-years.  
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Appendix C:  Variable descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
TOTREV Total Revenue 
CONT Contributions 
GRANTS Grants 
FUNDBAL Fund Balance 
ASSETS Total Assets, End of Year 
INVINC Investment Income 
SOLICIT Fundraising Expenses 
EXPS Total Expenses 
COMPENS Total Officer Compensation 
OTHSAL Total Non-Officer Compensation 
ROA 
Return on Assets: Total revenue /  
Lagged Total Assets 
 
This Appendix presents descriptions of the main financial variables used in this study. Data for 
all variables presented here comes from the National Center for Charitable Statistics. 
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Appendix D:  General state enforcement measures 
Panel A:  Proxy descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
STLOCENFEMPLOY_CAP 
State and local law enforcement employees per 100,000 residents  
(monitoring, detection, law enforcement) BJS 2004 Census, Appendix Table 1 
STENFEMPLOY_CAP 
State law enforcement employees per 100,000 residents  
(monitoring, detection, law enforcement) BJS 2004 Census, Table 6 
JUDEMPLOY_CAP 
Judicial and legal employees per 10,000 residents               
(prosecution, courts, and public defense) 
BJS Justice Expenditure and Employment 
Extracts for 2007, Table 8 
JUDEXPEND_CAP 
Judicial and legal expenditures per 10,000 residents              
(prosecution, courts, and public defense) 
BJS Justice Expenditure and Employment 
Extracts for 2007, Table 8 
DHHS_FRAUD 
Number of state enforcement actions taken against health and 
human services organizations that were listed in an OIG online 
news feed between April 1, 2010 and March 30, 2011 
OIG State Enforcement  
online news feed 
CIVIL_FRAUD 
Number of civil monetary penalty settlements for false and 
fraudulent claims that were listed in an OIG online news feed 
between March 3, 2003 and February 7, 2011 
OIG Enforcement Actions  
online news feed 
IRS_ENFORCE % of tax-exempt organizations’ tax returns examined, by year IRS Data Books 2006-2009: Table 13 
 
Panel B:  Correlations 
  
STLOCENFEMPLOY 
_CAP 
STENFEMPLOY 
_CAP 
JUDEMPLOY 
_CAP 
JUDEXPEND 
_CAP 
DHHS 
_FRAUD 
CIVIL 
_FRAUD 
IRS 
_ENFORCE 
STLOCENFEMPLOY_CAP   -0.12124 0.46815 0.28937 0.69383 0.26379 -0.00404 
STENFEMPLOY_CAP -0.10747   0.50823 0.04066 0.21599 0.04597 -0.0028 
JUDEMPLOY_CAP 0.51163 0.51531   0.62523 0.77026 0.4463 -0.0098 
JUDEXPEND_CAP 0.30098 0.0477 0.4097   0.68632 0.64699 -0.0092 
DHHS_FRAUD 0.81783 0.03131 0.56407 0.48455   0.47556 -0.00697 
CIVIL_FRAUD 0.35598 0.09312 0.17938 0.74591 0.45556   -0.00819 
IRS_ENFORCE -0.00662 -0.00351 -0.00889 -0.00998 -0.00857 -0.00801   
Appendix D, Panel A describes the six supplemental state enforcement proxies and the federal enforcement proxy. BJS = Bureau of Justice Statistics. OIG = 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General. Appendix D, Panel B Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported below 
(above) the diagonal. Most correlations are based on 616,751 NPO-years. Federal enforcement-state enforcement correlations are based on 241,904 NPO-years. 
All correlations are significant at p < .05, except for that between IRS_ENFORCE and STENFEMPLOY_CAP (in italics). It is insignificant.
3
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A:  Measures of central tendency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table contains descriptive statistics for the variables in this study. Variables are defined in Appendix C. Robust means are presented; all 
financial variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Note 1:  These state-specific governance indices were used with permission from the 
authors of "Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise" by Mihir Desai and Robert Yetman (DY; 2007). 
Desai and Yetman reported descriptive statistics for their indices in Table 3 of the DY paper for all states in the United States. DY reported means 
of 11.47 for the combined index, 6.75 for the Detection index, and 4.71 for the Prosecution index. The statistics for the sample studied here differ 
from DY's statistics because these cover only nineteen of all of the states. These nineteen states all had an aggressive detection mechanism in place 
with respect to audit requirements. Therefore, these states have slightly higher index ratings than the full sample of states, which includes states 
without that detection measure.  
Variable N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
TOTREV 580,423 $1,001,296 $1,527,501 $63,592 $174,079 $623,328 
CONT 580,423 $362,725 $977,171 $6,901 $50,229 $218,444 
GRANTS 109,039 $28,963 $71,508 $0 $0 $15,000 
FUNDBAL 580,423 $674,914 $704,246 $18,408 $88,595 $432,320 
ASSETS 580,423 $1,271,159 $920,151 $36,904 $162,878 $811,554 
INVINC 580,423 $13,974 $22,414 $11 $717 $5,180 
SOLICIT 580,423 $14,089 $87,114 $0 $0 $823 
EXPS 580,423 $951,577 $1,514,331 $57,507 $161,620 $587,970 
COMPENS 580,423 $25,667 $85,552,510 $0 $0 $33,300 
OTHSAL 485,210 $352,410 $57,825,011 $0 $2,770 $152,390 
ROA 546,843 4.64 47,215 0 2 4 
State-specific governance indices
1
 
      PROSECUTE 580,423 4.91 0.55 3   6 
DETECT 580,423 7.96 1.08 4   11 
COMBINED 580,423 12.87 1.41 8   16 
3
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(Table 1 continued) 
 
  Panel B:  State distribution        Panel C:  Year distribution 
 
STATE N % 
 
YEAR N % of final 
AR 6,528 1.12% 
 
1987 98 0.02% 
CA 49,234 8.48% 
 
1988 863 0.15% 
CT 15,881 2.74% 
 
1989 10,218 1.76% 
GA 15,121 2.61% 
 
1990 13,730 2.37% 
IL 39,698 6.84% 
 
1991 14,591 2.51% 
KS 17,035 2.93% 
 
1992 15,823 2.73% 
MA 53,984 9.30% 
 
1993 16,525 2.85% 
MD 11,258 1.94% 
 
1994 17,357 2.99% 
MN 40,871 7.04% 
 
1995 18,472 3.18% 
MS 9,523 1.64% 
 
1996 19,708 3.40% 
NH 4,088 0.70% 
 
1997 25,180 4.34% 
NJ 43,256 7.45% 
 
1998 26,198 4.51% 
NM 7,375 1.27% 
 
1999^ 7,244 1.25% 
NY 119,728 20.63% 
 
2000 28,124 4.85% 
PA 78,492 13.52% 
 
2001 30,919 5.33% 
RI 2,895 0.50% 
 
2002 34,110 5.88% 
TN 19,328 3.33% 
 
2003 36,158 6.23% 
WI 36,833 6.35% 
 
2004 38,534 6.64% 
WV 9,295 1.60% 
 
2005 52,458 9.04% 
TOTAL 580,423 100.00% 
 
2006 52,157 8.99% 
    
2007 59,028 10.17% 
    
2008 56,196 9.68% 
    
2009 6,732 1.16% 
    
TOTAL 580,423 100.00% 
 
Table 1, Panel B (Panel C) presents the state (year) distribution of the total sample of state-
years. N represents how many NPO-year observations were included in this study. % of final = 
Percentage of final sample that came from each state (year). For example, 6.35% of the final 
sample came from Wisconsin. The Core files sometimes contain return information for years 
other than the main year listed. The 1989 and 1990 Core files contained some returns for 1987 
and 1988. The 2008 Core file included some IRS Form 990 information for 2009. These 
observations were retained in cross-sectional, pooled analyses. They were excluded whenever 
year became a factor in the analyses. All time-sensitive analyses spanned the years 
corresponding to the NCCS Core files: 1989-2008.  ^Note that the NCCS does not have data for 
1999. These 1999 observations were culled from other years’ files, such as 1998 and 2000.
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(Table 1 continued) 
 
Panel D:  NTEE distribution 
 
NTEE 
 
Frequency Percentage 
A Arts, Culture, and Humanities 121,073 20.86% 
C Environmental Quality, Protection, and Beautification 16,701 2.88% 
D Animal-Related 16,223 2.80% 
F Mental Health, Crisis Intervention 29,866 5.15% 
G Diseases, Disorders, Medical Disciplines 20,356 3.51% 
H Medical Research 3,477 0.60% 
I Crime, Legal Related 16,009 2.76% 
J Employment, Job Related 12,607 2.17% 
K Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition 10,540 1.82% 
L Housing, Shelter 53,178 9.16% 
M Public Safety 21,910 3.77% 
N Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics 83,947 14.46% 
O Youth Development 26,281 4.53% 
P Human Services - Multipurpose and Other 142,387 24.53% 
U Science and Technology Research Institutes, Services 3,692 0.64% 
V Social Science Research Institutes, Services 2,176 0.37% 
  
580,423 100.00% 
 Table 1, Panel D presents the NTEE (National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities) classifications of 
organizations within the total sample.  
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Table 2:  Bin counts of NPO-years, by state 
 
  AR CA CT GA IL KS MA MD MN MS NH NJ NM NY PA RI TN WI WV 
N10 146 683 400 264 1,018 460 1,266 266 978 261 54 141 149 2,722 2,134 57 464 927 225 
N09 124 551 373 257 938 464 1,064 247 891 250 52 158 141 2,587 1,804 62 420 864 230 
N08 88 538 405 227 836 414 1,049 233 800 205 53 113 140 2,214 1,715 46 406 816 218 
N07 79 530 293 294 800 347 893 210 705 189 41 129 125 2,063 1,581 45 337 749 252 
N06 88 417 304 177 714 352 884 192 672 200 45 131 125 1,891 1,498 37 320 719 178 
N05 71 366 295 157 644 294 816 184 609 205 34 108 95 1,824 1,389 42 292 648 187 
N04 62 369 262 163 587 300 715 167 579 189 36 92 99 1,597 1,171 35 302 595 185 
N03 55 286 249 125 605 243 716 159 544 149 33 96 103 1,586 1,159 39 248 581 173 
N02 50 276 233 124 538 225 711 143 498 153 26 101 83 1,541 1,074 21 263 554 158 
N01 46 251 226 114 550 238 813 131 475 147 23 98 68 1,609 1,043 32 218 530 149 
P01 48 227 189 108 414 186 456 109 362 127 24 50 59 1,245 940 30 216 467 114 
P02 49 208 158 96 433 206 487 137 361 108 22 64 75 1,180 889 35 210 464 114 
P03 55 194 157 78 404 169 480 106 351 118 21 61 72 1,184 873 23 187 407 103 
P04 56 164 162 87 388 179 424 108 342 118 21 54 59 1,147 832 27 160 393 101 
P05 36 184 149 74 356 162 428 105 283 109 25 44 43 1,097 758 19 168 392 92 
P06 45 145 111 71 328 188 422 100 295 119 20 56 60 1,009 719 18 153 372 95 
P07 37 135 123 77 314 155 434 104 306 106 22 63 43 999 705 18 141 379 92 
P08 37 137 131 59 330 127 398 92 296 71 14 50 57 892 671 19 139 334 110 
P09 33 134 136 55 306 132 395 84 287 89 21 52 51 932 610 23 119 301 103 
P10 37 115 125 52 287 125 374 74 263 75 9 30 53 878 663 24 135 315 72 
TOTAL 1,242 5,910 4,481 2,659 10,790 4,966 13,225 2,951 9,897 2,988 596 1,691 1,700 30,197 22,228 652 4,898 10,807 2,951 
 
This table presents bin counts per state. Vertical labels are bin labels. N10 is the tenth bin to the left of the threshold, based on bin intervals with 
width 5% of the respective state threshold. For example, the required audit threshold for California is $2,000,000 in revenue. The CA law that 
required audits of NPOs with revenues of at least $2 million went into effect on January 1, 2005. Bin N10 contains the number of NPOs that 
reported revenue between $1,000,000 and $1,099,999 for any year ending after January 1, 2005. As of the end of the 2008 NCCS Core files, 683 
NPOs landed in bin N10. Bin N01 falls just to the left of the required audit threshold. These NPOs just avoided the requirement to file an audit. 
Bin P01 falls just to the right of (and includes) the audit threshold. These NPOs reported revenues that should have triggered financial audits per 
state law. 
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Table 3:  Public Disclosure 
 
Panel A:  Smoothness 
statistics for NPO-years that 
just avoid audits 
 
Panel B: Percentage of NPO-years that just avoid audits 
        
         BD BB 
 
State % Just Avoid 
 
% Just Avoid 
  
MA* 7.1543 -2.7796 
 
MA 6.147% 
Three states with 
public disclosure 5.482% 
  
NY* 4.6524 -2.5404 
 
NJ 5.795% 
States without 
public disclosure 4.687% 
  
IL* 2.7222 -1.8212 
 
NY 5.328% 
    
NJ 1.9989 -1.3171 
 
IL 5.097% 
    KS 1.8144 -1.1625 
 
WV 5.049% 
    MN 1.7671 -1.3709 
 
CT 5.044% 
    RI 1.0008 -0.1529 
 
MS 4.920% 
    PA 0.9448 -0.7509 
 
RI 4.908% 
    WV 0.9120 -0.5308 
 
WI 4.904% 
    CT 0.8517 -0.7409 
 
MN 4.799% 
    WI 0.7192 -0.8134 
 
KS 4.793% 
    MS 0.4911 -0.7818 
 
PA 4.692% 
    MD 0.3698 0.6532 
 
TN 4.451% 
    CA -0.0265 -0.0697 
 
MD 4.439% 
    GA -0.1571 -0.0270 
 
GA 4.287% 
    NM -0.3033 1.0753 
 
CA 4.247% 
    NH -0.3452 0.9869 
 
NM 4.000% 
    AR -0.3669 0.5209 
 
NH 3.859% 
    TN -1.2088 1.0931 
 
AR 3.704% 
    
          Panel A of Table 3 reports the Burgstahler and Dichev (BD; 1997) smoothness statistics and Bennett and 
Bradbury (2010) smoothness statistics for bin N01 in each state, from BD's highest significance to BD's 
lowest significance. For both statistics, an absolute value greater than or equal to 2 is significant at p < .05. 
*Indicates significance at p < .01. 
          Panel B of Table 3 reports, by state from highest percentage to lowest percentage, the percentage of NPO-
years that land in bin N01, given that the NPO-year reports gross revenues between 50% below and 50% 
above the state-year audit threshold. For example, 30,197 NPOs reported gross revenues between 50% above 
and 50% below New York's respective state-year audit threshold. Of these 30,197 NPO-year observations, 
1,609 NPO-years landed in bin N01. The percentage of NPO-year observations that landed in the 'just avoid' 
bin was 1,609 / 30,197 = 5.328%. Combined for the three states that publicly disclose audit results (IL, MA, 
and NY), the percentage of NPO-year observations within 50% above and 50% below the respective state-
year audit threshold that lands in bin N01 is 5.482%. for the sixteen states that have audit requirements but 
that do not publicly disclose the results of those audits combined that probability is 4.687%. These 
percentages were significantly different: χ2 = 33.2341. 
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Table 4: Regression Analyses 
      
Pr(N01=1) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASSETS -0.2140 
    
-0.2040 
  114.4081 
    
92.5548 
  <.0001         <.0001 
CONTCH   -0.1066       -0.0187 
    44.9046 
   
14.2447 
    <.0001       0.0002 
ROA     -0.0152     -0.7240 
    
 
3.0848 
  
5.8569 
      0.0790     0.0155 
COMPENS 
   
0.0000 
 
-1.7800 
  
   
0.3533 
 
26.3020 
  
   
0.5523 
 
<.0001 
PROSECUTE         41,200 -1.8100 
    
   
0.6191 4.8693 
          0.4314 0.6097 
 
Table 4 presents results for the following logistic regression: 
 
E1:  Pr(N01=1)=α+β1*ASSETS+β2*CONTCH+β3*ROA+β4*PROSECUTE +β5*COMPENS+ε 
 
Table 4 lists the coefficient estimate, Wald Chi-Square statistic, and p-value for each variable. Coefficient 
estimates should be multiplied by 10
-6
. Standard errors are clustered by EIN (organization). For coefficients 
with p-values under p < .05, coefficients are in bold. Insignificant (p > .05) coefficients are italicized. Year, 
state, and NTEE fixed effects are included in the models, but these effects are excluded from this table for 
brevity. 7,219. NPO-years landed in bin N01 (just avoided audit). Note that the regressions for only 
PROSECUTE are clustered by state without modeled state fixed effects. Appendix C provides variable 
defintions. 
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Table 5:  Regression analyses of supplemental enforcement proxies 
 
 
Pr(N01=1)   
 
4 6 
STLOCENFEMPLOY_CAP -0.0008 0.0006 
  0.6191 0.2607 
  0.4314 0.6097 
STENFEMPLOY_CAP 0.00196 -0.0014 
  0.6191 0.2607 
  0.4314 0.6097 
JUDEMPLOY_CAP 0.0206 -0.0146 
  0.6191 0.2607 
  0.4314 0.6097 
JUDEXPEND_CAP 0.00589 -0.0036 
  0.6191 0.1974 
  0.4314 0.6568 
DHHS_FRAUD 0.0275 -0.0195 
  0.6191 0.2607 
  0.4314 0.6097 
CIVIL_FRAUD 0.2724 0.0359 
  1.5676 0.0252 
  0.2105 0.8738 
 
Table 5 presents results of logistic regressions of E1, models 4 and 6, re-run 12 separate times 
with each state enforcement proxy listed here. These proxies substituted for PROSECUTE in the 
original E1:  
 
E1:  Pr(N01=1)=α+β1*ASSETS+β2*CONTCH+β3*ROA+β4*PROSECUTE +β5*COMPENS+ε 
 
Coefficient estimates are followed by Wald Chi-Square statistics. In model 4, standard errors are 
clustered by state. There are year and NTEE fixed effects. In model 6, standard errors are 
clustered by EIN. There are year, state, and NTEE fixed effects. For coefficients with p-values 
under p < .05, coefficients are in bold. Financial variables are described in Appendix C. 
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 Table 6:   
Accounting Manipulation 
      
        Panel A:  Rental Expenses 
  
Panel B:  Cost Basis of Securities Sold 
    N Mean 
 
  N Mean 
 Repeat avoiders 63 0.2735 
 
Repeat avoiders 60 0.2697 
 One-time avoiders 157 -0.2341 
 
One-time avoiders 271 0.0353 
 Non-avoiders, large 703 -0.0961 
 
Non-avoiders, large 1,106 -0.2051 
 Non-avoiders, small 911 -0.1116 
 
Non-avoiders, small 1,401 -0.0926 
 
        Panel C:  Special Event Costs 
  
Panel D:  Cost of Goods Sold 
    N Mean 
 
  N Mean 
 Repeat avoiders 231 0.0162 
 
Repeat avoiders 108 -0.0218 
 One-time avoiders 1,458 0.0041 
 
One-time avoiders 713 -0.1364 
 Non-avoiders, large 4,973 0.0483 
 
Non-avoiders, large 3,474 -0.0456 
 Non-avoiders, small 7,640 0.0583 
 
Non-avoiders, small 2,310 -0.0702 
 
        
Table 6 presents the average annual percentage change in four different pre-threshold costs for four groups. The first 
group contains all NPO-years in bin N01 for which an NPO repeatedly landed in bin N01. This repeat avoiders group 
is the most likely to manipulate their accounting to continually avoid an audit. The second group, one-time avoiders, 
contains all NPO-years in bin N01 for which the NPO landed in bin N01 only once during the sample period. The 
third group, large non-avoiders, contains all NPO-years in bins P02, P03, P04, and P05. The fourth group contains all 
NPO-years in bins N02, N03, N04, and N05. For rental expenses and special event expenses, means are winsorized at 
the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. For the cost basis of securities sold and the cost of goods sold, means are winsorized at 
the 5% and 95% levels. Comparing the repeat avoiders group to all other groups in the same Panel, the means are 
significantly different (p<.05) for rental expenses and the cost basis of securities sold. 
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Figure 1.  Distribution of all state-years, 5% bins 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the cross-sectional, pooled distribution of NPO-years. Bin intervals are 5% of the respective state-year audit 
threshold. The arrow points to Bin N01, in which NPOs just avoid an audit. The dashed line to the right of the arrow between N01 and 
P01 indicates the standardized audit threshold.  BD = Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) smoothness statistics, for which a value greater 
than or equal to the absolute value of 2 is considered statistically significant with p < 0.05. Count = the number of NPOs landing in 
each bin. Count is plotted on the vertical axis. 
 
N10 N09 N08 N07 N06 N05 N04 N03 N02 N01 P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 
BD   -0.56 -0.32 -1.51 0.306 0.449 -2.14 0.208 -2.02 7.823 -8.09 1.102 -0.18 0.429 -0.66 -0.43 0.709 -0.77 0.294   
Count 13542 12309 11220 10209 9555 8831 8008 7638 7225 7219 5665 5591 5321 5083 4772 4571 4439 4194 4069 3899 
3500 
5500 
7500 
9500 
11500 
13500 
15500 
All state-years:  5% bins 
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Figure 2.  Unexpectedly large bin N01: Top three states 
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